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MUDDY WATERS: FAIR USE IMPLICATIONS OF
GOOGLE LLC V. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.
Gary Myers*
ABSTRACT–
Ooh
In the muddy water we’re falling
Ooh
In the muddy water we’re crawling
Holds me down
Hold me now
Sold me out
In the muddy waters we’re falling
— Laura Pergolizzi (LP) - “Muddy Waters,” Lost On You (Vagrant
Records 2016)
The United States Supreme Court ruling in Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc.1 ended a long-running dispute between two giant technology
companies. The case, which first began in 2010, has received considerable
attention and commentary with regard to the scope of copyright protection
for software and then about the contours of the fair use defense. The Court
ultimately left the software copyright questions for another day, but it did
render an important decision on fair use, the first major precedent on this
important topic since 1994.
The Court’s fair use ruling provides important guidance on the scope of
fair use in the context of computer software and other functional works, and
it provides some clarity on the extent to which a use of copyrighted works
can be deemed transformative. But the Court’s analysis might only
exacerbate the unpredictable nature of the fair use defense, particularly given
its treatment of the role of good faith, the scope of potential markets that may

*
Earl F. Nelson Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I wish to thank Dean Lyrissa
Lidsky and the University of Missouri Law School Foundation for research support for this article.
1
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
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be affected by an unauthorized use of copyrighted works, and the role (if
any) of the public interest in the market effect factor of the fair use analysis.
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I.

BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION

Oracle America, Inc. (“Oracle”) sued Google Inc. (“Google”) for
copyright infringement. Oracle claimed that “Google’s unauthorized use of
37 packages of Oracle’s Java application programming interface (‘API
packages’) in its Android operating system infringed Oracle’s patents and
copyrights.”2
API packages are carefully organized collections of source code that
programmers use as shortcuts to perform common tasks. API packages
contain two types of code. Declaring code provides functional specifications
and identifies the task to be performed as a kind of shorthand or taxonomy.
Implementing code is longer and more detailed, containing step-by-step
instructions for carrying out specific tasks. Thus, declaring code might
identify a task (for example, generating Bernoulli numbers), while the
implementing code instructs the computer on how to generate those
numbers.3
The first jury trial resulted in a verdict that Google infringed Oracle’s
copyrights, but the jury deadlocked as to whether Google’s copying was a
fair use. After the district court ruled that the API packages were not
copyrightable as a matter of law, Oracle successfully appealed to Federal
2

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 141
S. Ct. 1183 (2021), and vacated in part, No. 2017-1118, 2021 WL 1941874 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2021).
3
This algorithm was actually the first published complex computer program, written by Ada
Lovelace using amechanical device designed by Charles Babbage. See, e.g., WIKIPEDIA, Bernoulli
Number, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernoulli_number [https://perma.cc/3G42-YNWK] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2021).
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Circuit. The prior panel determined that declaring code and the structure,
sequence, and organization (“SSO”) of the Java API packages are
copyrightable.4 The court thus reinstated the jury’s infringement verdict and
remanded for a new trial on Google’s fair use defense.5
In the second jury trial, Google’s fair use defense was successful, and
Oracle appealed from the district court’s final judgment and its denial of
Oracle’s motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and for a new trial.
The Federal Circuit reversed, determining that Google’s use of the Java API
packages was not fair use as a matter of law.6
One key to the fair use analysis is an understanding of Oracle’s
licensing practices, after it acquired Sun Microsystem’s widely used Java
platform. Oracle makes the Java platform freely available to programmers
building applications (“apps”) but charges a licensing fee to those who want
to use the APIs in competing platforms or to embed them in an electronic
device. Oracle also had an open-source version of Java, “OpenJDK,” which
(like many open-source offerings) required that any improvements on the
packages be freely given away to the Java community.7
Google sought to develop a platform to attract Java developers to build
apps for Android. The Android team failed to develop its own APIs, and
Google was unable to reach a license agreement. Google chose to “[d]o Java
anyway and defend [its] decision, perhaps making enemies along the way.”8
Google wrote its own implementing code, but it copied verbatim the
declaring code for the 37 Java API packages—a total of 11,500 lines of

4

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1353. The Federal Circuit heard this case because it has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
in actions involving patent claims, including when the appeal raises only non-patent issues. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1). The court applied the law of the regional circuit in which the district court sits, which meant
it applied Ninth Circuit law on copyright issues. See Oracle Am., supra note 2, at 1190 (citing Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
6
Fair use is codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 107, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fairuse the factors to be considered shall
include—(1)the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofiteducational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all
the above factors.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
7
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1187.
8
Id.
5
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Oracle’s code. It also copied the SSO of the Java API packages.9 Android
has generated over $42 billion in advertising revenue for Google. Oracle
contended that many of its customers switched to Android or demanded
discounts from Oracle.10
The lower court held that Google’s actions constituted fair use. As to
the purpose and character of the use (the first factor), the court found
Google’s use was transformative because—though commercial in nature—
Google only used declaring code for mobile smartphones and wrote its own
implementing code. With regard to the second factor, the nature of the
copyrighted work, even though the declaring code and SSO were sufficiently
creative to qualify for copyright protection, they were heavily influenced by
functional considerations. Third, with regard to the amount and substantiality
of the portion used, Google’s copying was quantitatively small, and it only
took what was necessary for a transformative use. Fourth, as to market effect,
the taking caused no harm to the desktop and laptop computer markets.
Overall, the lower court found that reasonable minds could differ and that
the jury could reasonably have found that Google’s actions constituted a fair
use.11 Oracle then appealed.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S FAIR USE RULING
The Federal Circuit began its fair use analysis by stating familiar
general propositions about the doctrine — it recognizes the value of building
on prior works; it involves a case-by-case balancing; it focuses on whether
“copyright law’s goal of ‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,’ U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, ‘would be better served by allowing the
use than by preventing it’”; the burden of proof is on the defendant; and “fair
use is appropriate where a ‘reasonable copyright owner’ would have
consented to the use, i.e., where the ‘custom or public policy’ at the time
would have defined the use as reasonable.”12
The court summarized Oracle’s main argument on appeal, which was
that all four fair use factors favored it: “(1) the purpose and character of
Google’s use was purely for commercial purposes; (2) the nature of Oracle’s
work is highly creative; (3) Google copied 11,330 more lines of code than
necessary to write in a Java language-based program; and (4) Oracle’s
9

Id.
Id. at 1187–88.
11
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206 (N.D. Cal. June 8,
2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
rev’d and remanded, 141 S. Ct. 1183, and vacated in part, No. 2017-1118, 2021 WL 1941874 (Fed. Cir.
May 14, 2021), and aff’d sub nom. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 2017-1118, 2021 WL 1941874
(Fed. Cir. May 14, 2021).
12
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1191 (internal citation omitted).
10
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customers stopped licensing Java SE and switched to Android because
Google provided free access to it.”13
Before addressing these points, Judge O’Malley addressed the standard
of review. The court held that “whether the [lower] court applied the correct
legal standard to the fair use inquiry is a question we review de novo, whether
the findings relating to any relevant historical facts were correct are
questions which we review with deference, and whether the use at issue is
ultimately a fair one is something we also review de novo.”14
Fair use, Judge O’Malley noted, is ultimately a mixed question of law
and fact.15 Quoting Harper & Row, the court observed that “[w]here the
district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory
factors, an appellate court ‘need not remand for further factfinding but may
conclude as a matter of law that the challenged use does not qualify as a fair
use of the copyrighted work.’”16 The court also cited Ninth Circuit precedent
that indicated that the fair use analysis can involve reweighing of the
statutory factors by the appellate court, based on the record below.17 Thus,
the court observed that the fair use analysis is “a primarily legal exercise. It
requires a court to assess the inferences to be drawn from the historical facts
found in light of the legal standards outlined in the statute and relevant case
law and to determine what conclusion those inferences dictate.”18
In other words, “while inferences from the four-factor analysis and the
ultimate question of fair use are “legal in nature,” in the Ninth Circuit,
disputed historical facts represent questions for the jury. Where there are no
disputed material historical facts, fair use can be decided by the court alone.19
On the facts of this case, the court identified the following possible fact
issues:
• the history and origin of the copyrighted work, including what
declaring code is;
• how much of the copyrighted work was copied;
• whether there were other ways to write the API packages;

13

Id.
Id. at 1193.
15
Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
16
Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
17
Id. (citing Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003); L.A. News
Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 942 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 313
F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2002)).
18
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1193.
19
Id. at 1195 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)).
14
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• whether the copied material was used for the same purpose as in the
original work;
• whether the use was commercial in nature;
• whether Google acted in bad faith in copying the work;
• whether there are functional aspects to the copyrighted work that make
it less deserving of protection; and
• whether there was harm to the actual or potential markets for the
copyrighted work.20
The court noted that the parties eventually agreed on: “(1) what the
declaring codeis and what it does in Java SE and Android, and that the code
at issue was a work created by Oracle; (2) how many lines of code were
copied; (3) that there were other ways for Google to write API packages; and
(4) that Google used the API packages in Android for the same purpose they
were created for in Java.”21 The remaining issues were still in dispute.
Turning to the first fair use factor, the court found that purpose and
character of theuse were commercial in nature. The court rejected Google’s
arguments that its usewas non-commercial because it gives Android away
for free under an open source license and because Google’s revenue comes
from advertisements on its search engine, which preexisted Android. On the
first point, the court noted that “[g]iving customers ‘for free something they
would ordinarily have to buy’ can constitute commercial use.”22 On the
second point, the court noted that “commerciality does not depend on how
Google earns its money” — the economic benefit can be indirect.23 Thus,
Google’s use was held to be overwhelmingly commercial.
The court next addressed transformative use: “To be transformative, a
secondary work must either alter the original with new expression, meaning,
or message or serve a new purpose distinct from that of the original work.”24
Although not a prerequisite for a fair use finding, “the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like

20

Id. at 1196.
Id.
22
Id. at 1197 (quoting A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001), as
amended (Apr. 3, 2001), aff’d sub nom. A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002),
and aff’d sub nom. A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)).
23
Id. at 1198.
24
Id. at 1198 (citing Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
21
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commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”25 This factor,
the court noted, is a matter of law in the Ninth Circuit.26
Oracle contended that Google’s use was not transformative because it
did not alterthe APIs with “new expression, meaning, or message.”27 Google,
on the other hand, argued that it “used a small portion of the Java API
packages to create a newwork in a new context—Android, a platform for
smartphones, not desktops and servers.”28 The Federal Circuit held that
Google’s use was not transformative “because: (1) it does not fit within the
uses listed in the preamble to § 107; (2) the purpose of the API packages in
Android is the same as the purpose of the packagesin the Java platform; (3)
Google made no alteration to the expressive content or message of the
copyrighted material; and (4) smartphones were not a new context.”29
The Federal Circuit thus took a relatively narrow view of transformative
use — viewing the copying of code was not sufficiently transformative,
unlike the use in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.30
The court viewed Google’s actions in selecting the declaring code and the
SSO of 37 of the 166 API packages as excessive and thus transformative. To
this panel, Google’s writing of its own implementing code did not excuse the
copying, as “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of
his work he did not pirate.”31 Critically, in the Federal Circuit’s view,
“merely copying the material and moving it from one platform to another
without alteration is not transformative.”32 A change in format is not enough,
because a use is transformative only if it serves a different purpose or alters
the “expression, meaning, or message” of the original work.33 Further,
Google’s use of the copyrighted material was not in a new context
(smartphones) because the “Java SE APIs were in smartphones before
Android entered the market. Specifically, Oracle presented evidence that
Java SE was in SavaJe mobile phones and that Oracle licensed Java SE to
other smartphone manufacturers, including Danger and Nokia.”34

25

Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
Id. at 1199 (citing Mattel, 353 F.3d at 801; Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d
169, 175–77 (2d
Cir. 2018)).
27
Id.
28
Id. (quoting Br. for Def.-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 37, May 22, 2017, (Nos. 17-1118, -1202)).
29
Id.
30
Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
31
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1375).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
26
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In short, the court noted, when “the copying is verbatim, for an identical
function and purpose, and there are no changes to the expressive content or
message, a mere change in format (e.g., from desktop and laptop computers
to smartphones and tablets) is insufficient as a matter of law to qualify as a
transformative use.”35
Briefly addressing the conflicting views of the parties on whether
Google acted in bad faith, the court noted that Oracle claimed that Google
intentionally copied and knew it needed a license, while Google argued that
it complied with industry custom and believed that it could copy the
declaring code and SSO as long as it wrote its own implementing code.
Concluding its analysis of the first fair use factor, the court held “that, even
assuming the jury was unpersuaded that Google acted in bad faith, the highly
commercial and non-transformative nature of the usestrongly support the
conclusion that the first factor weighs against a finding of fairuse.”36
Turning to the second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—the
court stated: “Although it is clear that the 37 API packages at issue involved
some levelof creativity—and no reasonable juror could disagree with that
conclusion—reasonable jurors could have concluded that functional
considerations were both substantial and important. Based on that assumed
factual finding, we conclude thatfactor two favors a finding of fair use.”37
The third factor focuses on the “amount and substantiality of the portion
used in . . . the context of the copyrighted work, not the infringing work.”38
Factually, the court noted the parties had “stipulated that only 170 lines of
code were necessary to write in the Java language. It is undisputed, however,
that Google copied 11,500 lines of code—11,330 more lines than necessary
to write in Java.”39 Moreover, despite using a small percentage of Java
(11,500 lines of declaring code out of roughly 2.86 million lines of code in
the Java SE libraries), Google “copied the SSO for the 37 API packages in
its entirety.”40
Although the district court focused on Google’s desire for “inter-system
consistency,” Google significantly did not rely on any interoperability
arguments in this appeal.41 This crucial point is the result of the fact that
35

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1204.
37
Id. at 1205. Nonetheless, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit views this factor as less significant
in the overall fair use analysis. Id. (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394, 1402 (9th Cir.
1997); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803)).
38
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1205.
39
Id. at 1206.
40
Id.
41
Id.
36
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“Google specifically designed Android to be incompatible with the Java
platform and not allow for interoperability with Java programs.”42 This
concession by Google is ironic, given the general concern that software
interoperability is fundamentally important.
Instead, Google used Java because software developers were familiar
with and trained on the Java API packages. The court noted that “there is no
inherent right to copy in order to capitalize on the popularity of the
copyrighted work or to meet the expectations of intended customers.”43
As to the substantiality prong of this factor, the court noted:
Even assuming the jury accepted Google’s argument that it copied only a small
portion of Java, no reasonable jury could conclude that what was copied was
qualitatively insignificant, particularly when the material copied was important
to the creation of the Android platform. Google conceded as much when it
explained to the jury the importance of the APIs to the developers it wished to
attract.44

Thus, in summary, the court found that the third factor “is, at best,
neutral in the fair use inquiry, and arguably weighs against such a finding.”45
Addressing the last factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work,”46 the court began with familiar
general principles:
(1). This factor focuses not only on market harm in the present case, but
also on whether similar widespread conduct would impair the
potential market for the original.
(2). “[M]arket harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this
factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the
relative strength of the showing on the other factors.”47
(3). The impact on the market for potential derivative uses, including
potential licensing agreements, should be considered, as was noted
in Campbell.48

42

Id. at 1206 n.11 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 1206–07 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1401 (copying the most famous and well
recognized aspects of a work “to get attention” or “to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh”
is not a fair use)).
44
Id. at 1207.
45
Id.
46
17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4).
47
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.21
(1994)).
48
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
43
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(4). Copyright owners have the right to determine when, whether, and in
whatform to release a work into new markets.
In the lower court’s view, the jury could reasonably have found
Google’s use caused no harm to the market for the works in desktop and
laptop computers, because Sun made Java API packages available for free
and on open-source terms. 49 Oracle, on the other hand, appealed on the
ground that there was overwhelming evidence of actual and potential harm.50
The Federal Circuit agreed with Oracle, finding first that there was strong
evidence of actual market harm. The court cited evidence that Java SE was
used in mobile devices (Blackberry, SavaJe, Danger, and Nokia) and in
tablets (the Amazon Kindle), thus making the parties direct competitors. In
addition, when Android entered the market, Amazon selected it over Java
SE, and later was able to get a large discount to use Java SE in a newer Kindle
device.51
The court also found that Google’s copying could have an impact on
Oracle’s potential markets, as highlighted by the fact that Oracle and Google
engaged in (unsuccessful) licensing negotiations to license its work for
smartphones. Thus, the court noted: “Smartphones were, therefore, a
traditional, reasonable, or likelyto be developed market.”52
Next, the court rejected Google’s contention that Java SE and Android
were not direct competitors because Oracle did not make smartphones and
had not yet built its own smartphone platform. Even though Oracle never
built a smartphone, the court noted that “potential markets include licensing
others to develop derivative works.”53 As for the second point, a potential
market can be found even if the copyright owner “has no immediate plans to
enter it or is unsuccessful in doing so.”54 In sum, the court found that the four
factor weighed heavily in favor of Oracle, based on both the actual and
potential harm found in the record.
Finally, the court turned to the balancing of the four fair use factors.
Summarizing its conclusions, the court noted that:
factors one and four weigh heavily against a finding of fair use, while factor
two weighs in favor of such a finding and factor three is, at best, neutral.

49

See Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1197.
Id.
51
Id. at 1209.
52
Id. (quoting Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Service Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 91 (2d Cir. 2014))
(quotations omitted).
53
Id. at 1209–10 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592).
54
Id. at 1210 (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1119
(9th Cir. 2000); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998)).
50
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Weighing these factors together, we conclude that Google’s use of the declaring
code and SSO of the 37 API packages was not fair asa matter of law.55

The Federal Circuit held:
that allowing Google to commercially exploit Oracle’s work will not advance
the purposes of copyright in this case. Although Google could have furthered
copyright’s goals of promoting creative expression and innovation by
developing its own APIs, or by licensing Oracle’s APIs for use in developing a
new platform, it chose to copy Oracle’s creative efforts instead. Thereis nothing
fair about taking a copyrighted work verbatim and using it for the same purpose
and function as the original in a competing platform.56

The court ended this portion of the opinion with a caveat: “We do not
conclude that a fair use defense could never be sustained in an action
involving the copying of computer code. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has made
it clear that some such usescan be fair. We hold that, given the facts relating
to the copying at issue here—which differ materially from those at issue in
Sony and Sega—Google’s copying and use of this particular code was not
fair as a matter of law.”57
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S FAIR USE RULING
The gist of Justice Breyer’s majority opinion is summarized in the
opening paragraph: “we assume, for argument’s sake, that the material was
copyrightable. But we hold that the copying here at issue nonetheless
constituted a fair use. Hence, Google’s copying did not violate the copyright
law.”58 After discussing the basic nature of software code and recounting the
long history of this copyright dispute, Justice Breyer began his analysis by
reviewing the purposes and drawbacks of granting copyright incentives.59
Justice Breyer then noted that Congress specifically decreed that computer
software should be eligible to be copyrightable subject matter in 1980.60
Congress defined a “computer program” as “a set of statements or

55

Id.
Id.
57
Id. (first citing Sony, 203 F.3d at 608; then citing Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1527–28, (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Jan. 6, 1993)).
58
Google, 141 S. Ct. 1183 at 1190. Later in the opinion, the Court summarizes its reasons for not
addressing the copyright ability question: “Given the rapidly changing technological, economic, and
business-related circumstances, we believe we should not answer more than is necessary to resolve the
parties’ dispute. We shall assume, but purely forargument’s sake, that the entire Sun Java API falls within
the definition of that which can be copyrighted.” Id. at 1197.
59
Id. at 1196.
60
Id.
56
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instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result.”61
The opinion provides a short overview of fair use, noting that it is an
“‘equitable rule of reason’ that ‘permits courts to avoid rigid application of
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which thatlaw is designed to foster.’”62 Moreover, the Court synthesized the
prior fair use precedent, which indicated that the fair use factors are not
exhaustive, that the examples of fair use are not exclusive, and that particular
factors may be more important in some cases than in others.63
This, the Court noted, “the provision to set forth general principles, the
application of which requires judicial balancing, depending upon relevant
circumstances, including ‘significant changes in technology.’”64 Further, the
Court noted that context matters, and that fair use’s early origins as a judgemade doctrine reflect the common law nature of its reasoning and
application.65
The Court also noted that “copyright’s protection may be stronger
where the copyrighted material is fiction, not fact, where it consists of a
motion picture rather than a news broadcast, or where it serves an artistic
rather than a utilitarian function.”66 In addition, when “copyrightable
material is bound up with uncopyrightable material, copyright protection is
‘thin.’”67
Turning from these general principles to the particular context of
computer programs, the Court noted that that software is distinct from other
types of “literary works,” such as books and films, because software

61

Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 101)).
Id. at 1196 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
63
Id. at 1197 (first citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (1994); then citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
560 (1985); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev 1105, 1110 (1990)).
64
Id. at 1197 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984);
then quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“When technological
change has rendered its literalterms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of its basic
purpose”)).
65
Id. at 1198 (“The language of § 107, the “fair use” provision, reflects its judge-made origins. It is
similar to that usedby Justice Story in [Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass.
1841)]. That background, as well as modern courts’ use of the doctrine, makes clear that the concept is
flexible, that courts must apply it in light of the sometimes conflicting aims of copyright law, and that its
application may well vary depending upon context”).
66
Id. at 1197 (see Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237–38; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563; MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05: CHAPTER 13 INFRINGEMENT
ACTIONS—SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS: § 13.05 THE DEFENSE OF FAIR USE [A][2][a] (2021) [hereinafter
Nimmer on Copyright]).
67
Id. at 1198 (quoting Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 349 (1991) (noting
that “the copyright in a factual compilation is thin”)).
62
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generally serves functional purposes.68 Justice Breyer characterized the
functional aspects of software as causing “Congress to think long and hard
about whether to grant computer programs copyright protection.”69 Congress
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to assess copyright protection for software,
and the report eventually determined that the “availability of copyright
protection for computer programs is desirable.”70 Despite the overall
conclusion, Justice Breyer noted that CONTU sought to avoid “unduly
burdening users of programs and the general public,” and that copyright
“should not grant anyone more economic power than is necessary to achieve
the incentive to create.”71 Justice Breyer noted that fair use can also serve to
“prevent holders from using copyright to stifle innovation.”72 With these
caveats, Congress provided for copyright protection for computer software.73
The Court then turns to its central theme regarding the role of fair use
indelineating the scope of protection for software:
The upshot, in our view, is that fair use can play an important role in
determining the lawful scope of a computer program copyright, such as the
copyright at issue here. It can help to distinguish among technologies. It can
distinguish between expressive and functional features of computer code where
those features are mixed. It can focus on the legitimate need to provide
incentives to produce copyrighted material while examining the extent to which
yet further protection creates unrelated or illegitimate harms in other markets or
to the development of other products. In a word, it can carry out its basic
purpose of providing a context-based check that can help to keep a copyright
monopoly within its lawful bounds.74

68
Id. The Court went on to note that “[t]hese and other differences have led at least some judges to
complain that ‘applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle whose
pieces do not quite fit.’” (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J.,concurring), opinion aff’d 516 U.S. 233 (1996)).
69
Id.
70
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), Final Report
on the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 3 COMPUT. L.J. 53, 59
(1981) [hereinafter CONTU].
71
Google, 141 S. Ct.at 1198 (quoting CONTU at 12).
72
Id.
73
Id. (citing § 10, 94 Stat. 3028).
74
Id. at 1198–99 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, pp. 65–66 (1976)). The Court cited a number of
cases to illustrate this principle: see, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d
522, 543–45 (6th Cir. 2004) (fair use and compatibility); Sony Computer Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.3d 596, 603–08 (9th Cir. 2000) (fair use intermediate copying in order to reverse engineer and gain
access to unprotected functional software features); SegaEnterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1521–27 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Jan. 6, 1993) (wholesale copying of code so as to develop a
competing program).
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Thus, this Court emphasized the importance of fair use as a boundary
or limit on the scope of copyright protection for software, just as with other
types of subject matter: “Just as fair use distinguishes among books and
films, which are indisputably subjects of copyright, so too must it draw lines
among computer programs.”75 Further, fair use should “consider the realities
of how technological works are created and disseminated. We do not believe
that an approach close to ‘all or nothing’ would be faithful to the Copyright
Act’s overall design.”76
Next, Justice Breyer addressed the threshold question—what standard
of review applies to fair use determinations? On this point, Google contended
that it should be the deferential “substantial evidence” standard for factual
determinations. Oracle, on the other hand, argued that fair use constitutes a
mixed question of law and fact, under which the ultimate determination of
fair use is a matter of law (subject to de novo review), though findings of
underlying facts are reviewed deferentially.
Citing language from Harper & Row,77 the Court held squarely that
“[f]air use is a mixed question of law and fact.” Moreover, “the standard of
review for a mixed question all depends—on whether answering it entails
primarily legal or factual work.”78 Here, determinations of fair use is deemed
to be legal work: “‘Fair use’ was originally a concept fashioned by judges.
Our cases still provide legal interpretations of the fair use provision. And
those interpretations provide general guidance for future cases. This type of
work is legal work.”79
As suggested by the term “mixed question of law and fact[,]” some
underlying factual determinations are assessed under the deferential standard
of review. TheCourt provided two illustrations of that concept: “whether
there was harm to the actual or potential markets for the copyrighted work”
and “how much of the copyrighted work was copied.”80
Finally, the Court addressed the merits of the fair use determination,
starting with an assessment of the nature of the copyrighted work. First, the
Court observed that “Sun Java API is a ‘user interface.’ It provides a way
through which users (here the programmers) can ‘manipulate and control’
75

Id. at 1199.
Id.
77
Id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
78
Id. (citing U. S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018)).
79
Id. at 1199–1200 (citing Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592–93; Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 564; Sony, 464 U.S. at 451; U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967).
80
Id. at 1200 (citing Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1196). The Court also addressed Google’s Seventh
Amendment claim, finding that the right to a jury trial was not violated because fair use is essentially an
equitable determination made by courts.
76
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task-performing computer programs ‘via a series of menu commands.’”81
The Court broke down the software into three parts, the first being
implementing code, which Google programmers independently created to
perform tasks. Second, the Sun Java API contains commands to call up a
particular program, which Oracle did not claim to be a copyright violation.
Third, Java’s API contains declaring code, which labels particular tasks in
the API and organizes them into packages and classes. “We have referred to
this organization, by way of rough analogy, as file cabinets, drawers, and
files.”82 Oracle’s copyright claim focused on Google’s use of this declaring
code.
Addressing this copyright claim, the Court noted that the declaring code
“is inextricably bound together with . . . the division of computing tasks, that
no one claims is a proper subject of copyright. It is inextricably bound up
with the idea of organizing tasks into what we have called cabinets, drawers,
and files, an idea thatis also not copyrightable. It is inextricably bound up
with the use of specific commands known to programmers . . . that Oracle
does not here contest.”83
Declaring code does not involve the creativity that coders exercise
when they write implementing code that, for example, would run more
efficiently on a smartphone than on a laptop. Instead, declaring code involves
“names that would prove intuitively easy to remember” and a system that
programmers can become accustomed to using.84 Declaring code is therefore
largely functional and “is, if copyrightable at all, further than are most
computer programs (such as the implementing code) from the core of
copyright.”85 Thus, the Court found that this factor—the nature of the work—
points favorably toward Google fair use defense.86
Next, the Court turned to the purpose and character of the use, noting
that this includes a decision about whether the use creatively contributed a
“new expression, meaning or message.”87 Hence, the Court has focused on
whether the use was transformative.88 The Court observed that “Google
copied portions of the Sun Java API . . . to enable programmers to call up
implementing programs that would accomplish particular tasks. But since
81

Id. at 1201 (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 809).
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1202 (citation omitted).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
88
Id. at 1203 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–81) (“[A]s we held in Campbell, a parody can be
transformative because it comments on the original or criticizes it, for ‘[p]arody needs to mimic an
original to make its point’”).
82
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virtually any unauthorized use of a copyrighted computer program (say, for
teaching or research) would do the same, to stop here would severely limit
the scope of fair use in the functional context of computer programs.”89
Google’s purpose for copying the API was to create new software that would
run on Android smartphones, which the Court deemed to be “highly creative
and innovative” and consistent with the innovative goals of copyright law.90
The Court characterized Google’s use of the API as “only insofaras needed
to include tasks that would be useful in smartphone programs” so that
programmers could call upon those tasks in a familiar programming
language. It was, the Court stated, a “reimplementation,” taking a system and
implementing it in a new setting (using independently created implementing
code).91 Technically, only 170 of the 11,500 lines of code were actually
needed to run Java on the Android platform.
The Court noted evidence that “shared interfaces are necessary for
different programs to speak to each other” and for programmers to “use their
acquired skills.”92 Moreover, it was common to reuse APIs, and that Sun
itself had done sowhen it created Java. Thus, the Court found that Google’s
use of the code was transformative, another factor weighing in favor of fair
use.93
Addressing other considerations built into the first fair use factor, the
Court acknowledged that Google’s use was a commercial and for profit, but
that point “is not dispositive of the first factor, particularly in light of the
inherently transformative role that the reimplementation played in the new
Android system.”94
With regard to bad faith, the Court made one of its more noteworthy
statements. Justice Breyer expressed doubts about the role of bad faith in the
determination of fair use: “As for bad faith, our decision in Campbell
expressed some skepticism about whether bad faith has any role in a fair use
analysis. We find this skepticism justifiable, as ‘[c]opyright is not a privilege
reserved for the well-behaved.’”95 Overall, the Court had “no occasion here
to say whether good faith is as a general matter a helpful inquiry. We simply
note that given the strength of the other factors pointing toward fair use and

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1203–04 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1204.
Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18 (quoting Leval, supra note 64, at 1126)).
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the jury finding in Google’s favor on hotly contested evidence, that fact
bound consideration is not determinative in this context.”96
The next fair use factor is the amount and substantiality of the portion
used. It was undisputed that Google copied 11,500 lines of declaring code
for 37 API packages.The Court deemed this a small quantitative amount of
the 2.86 million lines of JavaAPI software code, or 0.4 percent of the entire
work. The Court acknowledged that a small taking can exceed fair use’s
protective boundaries if it constitutes the “heart of the work.”97 But the Court
noted that “copying a larger amount of material can fall within the scope of
fair use where the material copied captureslittle of the material’s creative
expression or is central to a copier’s valid purpose.”98
Intriguingly, the Court noted that taking a single sentence from a novel
would be insubstantial, but then offered a contrary illustration: “if that single
sentence set forth one of the world’s shortest short stories—’When he awoke,
the dinosaur was still there.’—the question looks much different, as the
copied material constitutes a small part of the novel but the entire short
story.”99
Contrasted with the more than two million lines of code in Java, the
Court found that Google copied 11,500 lines “not because of their creativity,
their beauty, or even (in a sense) because of their purpose. It copied them
because programmers had already learned to work with the Sun Java API’s
system, and it would have been difficult, perhaps prohibitively so, to attract
programmers to build its Android smartphone system without them.”100
Given what the Court found to be Google’s transformative purpose, this
copying was permitted.101
Significantly, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit view that only 170
lines of code were needed to use the Java language, i.e., that Google took too
much of theJava code. The Court stated:
Google’s basic objective was not simply to make the Java programming
language usable on its Android systems. It was to permit programmers to make
use of their knowledge and experience using the Sun Java API when they wrote
new programs for smartphones . . . . In principle, Google might have created its
96

Id.
Id. at 1205 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–65).
98
Id. (citations omitted).
99
Id. (quoting A. Monterroso, El Dinosaurio, in Complete Works & Other Stories 42 (E. Grossman
transl. 1995)). The Court noted that the original Spanish, version of the story states: “Cuando despertó,
el dinosaurio todavía estabaallí.” Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (explaining that this factor
“will harken back to the first of the statutory factors, for . . . the extent of permissible copying varies with
the purpose and character of the use”)).
97
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own, different system of declaring code. But the jury couldhave found that its
doing so would not have achieved that basic objective. In a sense, the declaring
code was the key that it needed to unlock the programmers’ creative energies.102

Thus, the Court found that both the amount and the substantiality of the
taking weigh in favor of fair use.
Finally, the Court turned to the effect of the taking on the “market for
or value of the copyrighted work.”103 To the Court, “at least where computer
programs are at issue, [this issue] can prove more complex than at first it
may seem.”104 Justice Breyer explained that not only the amount of the
potential loss, but also its source must be considered: “As we pointed out in
Campbell, a ‘lethal parody, like a scathing theatre review,’ may ‘kil[l]
demand for the original.’ Yet this kind of harm, even if directly translated
into foregone dollars, is not ‘cognizable under the Copyright Act.’”105
The Court then added a seemingly new consideration: “we must take
into account the public benefits the copying will likely produce. Are those
benefits, for example, related to copyright’s concern for the creative
production of new expression? Are they comparatively important, or
unimportant, when compared with dollar amounts likely lost (taking into
account as well the nature of the sourceof the loss)?”106
Considering the amount that Oracle may have lost, the Court cited
evidence that “Sun was poorly positioned to succeed in the mobile phone
market.”107 It also noted that Google did not simply repurpose Java code from
larger computers to smaller devices, because the “Android platform was part
of a distinct (and more advanced) market than Java software.”108 Google’s
program thus was a new form of technology and a different type of product.
The Court also cited evidence that Google’s use of Java would actually
benefit Oracle because it would expand the number of coders who could
work with Java in both the smartphone and the laptopspheres.109

102

Id.
Id. at 1206 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4)).
104
Id.
105
Id. (citations omitted).
106
Id. Justice Breyer cured only one lower court case from 1981, MCA, INC. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d
180, 183 (2d Cir.1981). The Court offered the following caveats: “We do not say that these questions are
always relevant to the application of fair use, not even in the world of computer programs. Nor do we say
that these questions are the onlyquestions a court might ask. But we do find them relevant here in helping
to determine the likely market effects of Google’s reimplementation.” Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1206.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1207.
109
Id. Citing Nimmer on Copyright, the Court noted that the market effect factor focuses on how
“widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant” would affect the market for the work. Id.
(quoting Nimmer on Copyright at § 13.05[A][4]).
103
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The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on Oracle’s lost
licensing opportunity, quoting Nimmer’s observation that there is a “‘danger
of circularity posed’ by considering unrealized licensing opportunities
because ‘it is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a
potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for
licensing the very use at bar.’”110 Justice Breyer acknowledged the enormous
revenues and profits that Google has obtainedfrom its Android platform, but
attributed the value of Java more to the investment that programmers have
made in learning to use Java and less to Oracle’s own efforts.111
Finally, Justice Breyer turned to the new “harm to the public” factor.
Enforcing Oracle’s copyright would interfere with “creative improvements,
new applications, and new uses developed by users who have learned to
work with that interface.”112 Summarizing its assessment of the fourth fair
use factor, the Court found that it too weighs in favor of fair use given “[t]he
uncertain nature of Sun’s ability to compete in Android’s market place, the
sources of its lost revenue, and the risk of creativity-related harms to the
public . . . .”113
Justice Breyer paused to observe that the functional nature of software
“makes it difficult to apply traditional copyright concepts in that
technological world.”114 Justice Breyer specifically stated that those concepts
were not altered by the fair use finding in this case: “[W]e do not overturn or
modify our earlier cases involving fair use— cases, for example, that involve
“knockoff “ products, journalistic writings, and parodies.”115 Instead, the
Court has applied the fair use framework in a new context and for a different
kind of work: “where Google reimplemented a user interface, taking only
what was needed to allow users to put their accrued talents towork in a new
and transformative program, Google’s copying of the Sun Java API was a
fair use of that material as a matter of law.”116
Five Justices joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion. Justice Barrett
did not participate in the case. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice

110

Id. (quoting Nimmer on Copyright at § 13.05[A][4]).
Id. at 1208 (“We have no reason to believe that the Copyright Act seeks to protect third parties’
investment in learning how to operate a created work.” (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (discussing
harms “cognizable underthe Copyright Act”))).
112
Id. at 1208. Noting copyright law’s incentive to disseminate ideas, the Court found that “the
reimplementation of a userinterface allows creative new computer code to more easily enter the market.”
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. (citing Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 820 (Boudin, J., concurring)).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1209.
111
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Alito.117 His powerful opening paragraph demonstrates his disagreement
with the majority’s approach:
Oracle spent years developing a programming library that successfully attracted
software developers, thus enhancing the value of Oracle’s products. Google
sought a license to use the library in Android, the operating system it was
developing for mobile phones. But when the companies could not agree on
terms, Google simply copied verbatim 11,500 lines of code from the library. As
a result, it erased 97.5% of thevalue of Oracle’s partnership with Amazon, made
tens of billions of dollars, and established its position as the owner of the largest
mobile operating system in the world. Despite this, the majority holds that this
copying was fair use.118

He proceeded to argue that Justice Breyer’s analysis contradicts the
express Congressional decision to protect software: “By skipping over the
copyrightability question, the majority disregards half the relevant statutory
text and distorts its fair-use analysis. Properly considering that statutory text,
Oracle’s code at issue here is copyrightable, and Google’s use of that
copyrighted code was anything but fair.”119
Justice Thomas’ factual summary succinctly captured the contrary view
to the majority’s characterization of the facts:
Google wanted to attract those programmers to Android by including in
Android the [Java] declaring code with which they were now familiar. But the
founder of Android, Andrew Rubin, understood that the declaring code was
copyrighted, so Google sought a custom license from Oracle. At least four times
between 2005 and 2006, the two companies attempted to negotiate a license,
but they were unsuccessful, in part because of “trust issues.”
When those negotiations broke down, Google simply decided to use Oracle’s
code anyway. Instead of creating its own declaring code—as Apple and
Microsoft chose to do—Google copied verbatim 11,500 lines of Oracle’s
declaring code and arranged that code exactly as Oracle had done. It then
advertised Android to device manufacturers as containing “Core Java
Libraries.”120

Justice Thomas began his dissent with a strong argument that declaring
code, like implementing code, is fully eligible for protection under the
Copyright Act: “As the majority correctly recognizes, declaring code and
implementing code are ‘inextricably bound’ together. Declaring code defines
the scope of a set of implementing code and gives a programmer a way to
117
118
119
120
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Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1210–11 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1212 (citations omitted).
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use it by shortcut. Becausedeclaring code incorporates implementing code,
it has no function on its own . . . Absent declaring code, developers would
have to write every program from scratch, making complex programs
prohibitively time consuming to create. The functionality of both declaring
code and implementing code will thus typically riseand fall together.”121
Justice Thomas then questioned the majority’s application of the fair
use doctrine: “By skipping copyrightability, the majority gets the
methodology backward, causing the Court to sidestep a key conclusion that
ineluctably affects the fair-use analysis: Congress rejected categorical
distinctions between declaring and implementing code. But the majority
creates just such a distinction.”122 Justice Thomas then makes a critical
observation: “The result of this distorting analysis is an opinion that makes
it difficult to imagine any circumstance in which declaring code will remain
protected by copyright.”123
After stating his agreement with the majority on the standard of review,
Justice Thomas turned to the application of the fair use factors. With regard
to the nature of the copyrighted work, he acknowledged that copying of
functional works is favored, but noted that “Congress determined that
declaring and implementing code are copyrightable, this factor alone cannot
support a finding of fair use.”124 On a practical level, he noted that
“[d]evelopers cannot even see implementing code. Implementing code thus
conveys no expression to developers. Declaring code, in contrast, is user
facing. It must be designed and organized in a way that is intuitive and

121
Id. at 1213. Justice Thomas includes an elegant analogy to help explain the difference between
declaring code andimplementing code:
In the 1990s, Oracle created a programming language called Java. Like many programming languages,
Java allows developers to prewrite small subprograms called “methods.” Methods form the building
blocks of more complex programs. This process is not unlike what legislatures do with statutes. To save
space and time, legislatures define terms and then use those definitions as a shorthand. For example, the
legal definition for “refugee” is more than 300 words long. Rather than repeat all those words every time
they are relevant, the U. S. Code encapsulates them all with a single term that it then inserts into each
relevant section. Java methods work similarly. Once a method has been defined, a developer need only
type a few characters (the method name and relevant inputs) to invoke everything contained in the
subprogram. A programmer familiar with prewritten methods can string many of them together to quickly
develop complicated programs without having to write from scratch all the basic subprograms.
To create Java methods, developers use two kinds of code. The first, “declaring code,” names the method,
defines what information it can process, and defines what kind of data it can output. It is like the defined
term in a statute. The second, “implementing code,” includes the step-by-step instructions that make those
methods run. It is like thedetailed definition in a statute. Id. at 1211.
122
123
124

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1214 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1215.
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understandable to developers so that they can invoke it.”125 With regard to
the majority’s statement that declaring code is “inherently bound together
with uncopyrightable ideas,” Justice Thomas noted:
Is anything not? Books are inherently bound with uncopyrightable ideas—the
use of chapters, having a plot, or including dialogue or footnotes. This does not
place books far ‘from the core of copyright.’ . . . We have not discounted a work
of authorship simply because it is associated with noncopyrightable ideas.
While ideas cannot be copyrighted, expressions of those ideas can.126

On the majority’s focus on the time coders invested in learning a
computer language, Justice Thomas drew an analogy to a Broadway musical
script: “a theater cannot copy a script . . . simply because it wants to entice
actors to switch theaters and because copying the script is more efficient than
requiring the actors to learn a new one.”127 Further, Justice Thomas noted that
“[w]hat the majority says is true of declaring code is no less true of
implementing code . . . . The majority correctly recognizes that declaring
code ‘is inextricably bound up with implementing code,’ but it overlooks the
implications of its own conclusion.”128 In his view, this assumption about the
protection afforded to declaring code “taints the Court’s entire analysis.”129
Justice Thomas then turned to the effect on the market, “the single most
important element of fair use.”130 Noting the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that
there was overwhelming evidence that Google’s copying of code caused
actual and potential harm, “Google ruined Oracle’s potential market in at
least two ways.”131 The first was that Google released Android free of charge
as its business model was based on ad revenue and on harvesting consumer
data, and thus device manufacturers no longer had as much reason to pay for
the fee-based Java platform.132
The second type of harm was Google impingement of Oracle’s
opportunities to continue to license Java to developers of smartphone
operating systems, which it had been doing until Google introduced its
Android platform. Addressing Justice Breyer’s contention that Oracle was
125

Id. (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1215–16 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
127
Id. at 1216.
128
Id. (citation omitted).
129
Id.
130
Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566).
131
Id.
132
Id. Justice Thomas offered the following illustration: “[B]efore Google released Android,
Amazon paid for a license to embed the Java platform in Kindle devices. But after Google released
Android, Amazon used the cost-free availability of Android to negotiate a 97.5% discount on its license
fee with Oracle. Evidence at trial similarly showed that right after Google released Android, Samsung’s
contract with Oracle dropped from $40 million to about $1 million.” Id.
126
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not likely to succeed in entering the developing smartphone market itself,
Justice Thomas noted the importance of “potential markets the copyright
holder might ‘license others to develop.’”133
Addressing the majority’s focus on harm to the public, Justice Thomas
noted that only 7.7% of current Android devices run the versions at issue in
this case.134 Moreover, Apple and Microsoft created their own device
operating systems independently, Java was always freely available to coders,
and any lower court remedy would likely involve damages, not an injunction
against the use of Android. In short, Justice Thomas concluded that “Google
decimated Oracle’s market and created a mobile operating system now in
over 2.5 billion actively used devices, earning tens of billions of dollars every
year. If these effects on Oracle’s potential market favor Google, something
is very wrong with our fair-use analysis.”135
Turning next to the purpose and character of the use, Justice Thomas
contended that both of these important considerations favor Oracle. Google
had a clear profit motive for its copying, earning $18 billion from Android
in 2015 alone, a number that has grown since that time. Acknowledging that
a transformative use can sometimes outweigh this commercial purpose, it
does not do so when it supplants the market for the original.136
Focusing on transformative use, Justice Thomas argued that Google’s
adaptation of Java code for use in mobile devices did not fulfill any favored
copyright purpose. In order to “‘avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh,’ Google used the declaring code for the same exact purpose Oracle
did.”137
To the majority, Justice Thomas contended, transformative uses involve
those that simply create new products: “That new definition eviscerates
copyright. A movie studio that converts a book into a film without
permission not only creates a new product (the film) but enables others to
‘create products’—film reviews, merchandise, YouTube highlight reels, late
night television interviews, and the like.”138
133
Id. at 1217 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592). By way of analogy, Justice Thomas noted that
“[a] book author need not be able to personally convert a book into a film so long as he can license
someone else to do so. That Oracle could have licensed its code for use in Android is undisputed.” Id.
134
Google LLC v. Oracle of Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (2021).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1218 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
137
Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580). Quoting the Federal Circuit, Justice Thomas added that
“[t]here is nothing fair abouttaking a copyrighted work verbatim and using it for the same purpose and
function as the original in a competing
platform.” Id. (quoting Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1210).
138
Id. (“Nearly every computer program, once copied, can be used to create new products. Surely
the majority would not say that an author can pirate the next version of Microsoft Word simply because
he can use it to createnew manuscripts.”).
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To Justice Thomas, “the majority wrongly conflates transformative use
with derivative use. To be transformative, a work must do something
fundamentally different from the original. A work that simply serves the
same purpose in a new context—which the majority concedes is true here—
is derivative, not transformative.”139
With regards to the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
Justice Thomas observed that it was not disputed that Google copied the
heart of the plaintiff’s work, and that it did so verbatim: “The majority does
not disagree. Instead, it concludes that Google took no more than necessary
to create new products. That analysis fails because Google’s use is not
transformative.”140 Justice Thomas also disputed the quantitative
assessment—although 11,500 lines of declaring code (“enough to fill about
600 pages in an appendix”) was a small amount of the overall work, “the
proper denominator is declaring code, not all code.”141 To Justice Thomas,
the declaring code drew programmers and effectively made the Android
platform a substitute, depriving Oracle of a licensed derivatives market. He
would have found Google’s copying to be substantial both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
Overall, Justice Thomas contended that all fair use factors favored
Oracle, except for the nature of the copyrighted work. He concluded that “the
majority cannot square its fundamentally flawed fair-use analysis with a
finding that declaring codeis copyrightable. The majority has used fair use
to eviscerate Congress’ considered policy judgment.”142
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Google v. Oracle is a landmark fair use case, the first Supreme Court
decision on the merits of this important doctrine since 1994. It is also a
definitive statement about the scope of copyright protection for software, at
least from the standpoint ofthe applicability of the fair use defense. Further,
it is a relatively rare majority opinion in the copyright field by Justice Breyer,
who is generally less protective of authors’ rights than the late Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsberg. This article suggests there are several critical take-aways
from the 6-2 ruling.
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Id. Justice Thomas continued: “Congress made clear that Oracle holds ‘the exclusive rights . . .
to prepare derivative works.’ § 106(2). Rather than create a transformative product, Google ‘profit[ed]
from exploitation of the copyrighted materialwithout paying the customary price.’ Id. (quoting Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
140
Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
141
Id.
142
Id.
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A. Unpredictable Fact-Specific Balancing
The limited number of modern Supreme Court decisions in the fair use
field provide limited guidance as to the fair use defense. The general lack of
predictability is particularly pronounced given the Court’s fervent adoption
of a fact-specific, case-by-case balancing test in all fair use determinations.
This approach is a common theme among the prior trilogy of cases— Sony,
Harper & Row, and most prominently in Campbell—and Google v. Oracle
continues that tradition. Indeed, a common view shared by the majority and
the dissent in the new ruling is support for that case-specific approach, albeit
with widely differing conclusions. There continue to be no evidentiary
presumptions, no short-cuts, no safe harbors, and no presumptive unfair uses.
The best evidence of how unpredictable fair use determinations can be
ex ante is the deeply divided judiciary in each of the four modern fair use
cases. In Sony, the lower court judge found that time-shifting of broadcast
movies was fair use, a ruling that was reversed by the three-judge Ninth
Circuit panel, and finally that decision was reversed by a deeply divided 5-4
Supreme Court. In Harper & Row, the lower court judge found that the
Nation magazine’s quotations from a purloined copy of an as-yet
unpublished Ford memoir was not fair use, a ruling that was reversed by the
three-judge Second Circuit panel (in a 2-1 vote), and finally that decision
was reversed by a deeply divided 6-3 Supreme Court. In Campbell, the lower
court judge found that 2 Live Crew’s use of the opening line and bass riff
from the Roy Orbison song, Pretty Woman, was a fair use, a ruling that was
reversed by a divided three-judge Sixth Circuit panel, and finally that
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. In Google v. Oracle, the lower
court found that Google’s use of Oracle code was fair use, a ruling that was
reversed by the three-judge Federal Circuit panel, and finally that decision
was reversed by a 6-2 Supreme Court decision. In short, in each of these
cases, experienced federal judges with life tenured appointments were deeply
divided as to the outcome of thefair use balancing test.143
The unpredictable nature of the fair use defense might seem like a virtue
for this who seek a nuanced and fact-specific determination of the scope of
copyright claims and defenses. Yet, this uncertainty means that those who
seek to use copyrighted materials cannot make a strong prediction of their
ability to do, making it difficult to clear intellectual property rights. It also
means that copyright owners face uncertain waters in deciding whether a
lawsuit will be likely to succeed. Finally, it makes fair use determinations
expensive and burdensome on both the courts and the parties themselves.

143

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539; Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 417.
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B. A Broad Fair Use Defense in Software Cases
In considering activities that might be particularly favored under the
Court’s jurisprudence, three illustrative areas now emerge: non-commercial
time shifting of television programs as found in Sony, parody of a wellknown popular work, as addressed in Campbell, and copying of functional
expression for purposes of computer program interoperability in Google v.
Oracle. Many in the software field will laud this ruling for freeing them from
liability concerns when the copy code (and SSO) necessary for
interoperability, particularly declaring code. It certainly seems that
interoperability is a laudable and favored use in copyright law as it applies
to computer programs. There is an irony in that Google’s inability to license
Java was partly because it did not want to comply with the standard Java
terms.144
Despite this wrinkle, which was important to the Federal Circuit and to
the Thomas dissent, interoperability in general is certainly an important goal,
as all software builds on prior work, as is true in most fields.
Reimplementation of code is a common and customary practice.
There is a close analogy to the Court’s deference to copying for
purposes of parody in Campbell. There, the Court noted the need to conjure
up the original creative work in order to make the parody recognizable and
successful. Thus, 2 Live Crew needed to copy the distinctive bass riff and
the powerful opening line of “Oh Pretty Woman,” though the Court left open
the issue of whether it repeated the bass riff too often.
Here, the Court effectively sanctioned the copying of 11,500 lines of
declaring code to facilitate the writing of new software on the Google
platform. The parties had stipulated that only 170 lines of code were
necessary to write in the Java language. Thus, questions arise as to whether
declaring code has any copyright protection as well. In addition, the Court
did not even mention the SSO, which similarly suggested a lack of significant
protection for this software feature. Critically, no implementing code was
copied — Google wrote its own new implementing code. But the analogy
stands — Google was able to directly copy expressive computer code so as
to make its new software platform work, just as 2Live Crew could copy
musical expression to carry out its song parody.
Google argued that it complied with industry custom and believed that
it could copy the declaring code and SSO as long as it wrote its own
implementing code. This view was shared by my many industry observers
and commentators, who viewed Google’s actions as customary practice.
144
“Google specifically designed Android to be incompatible with the Java platform and not allow
forinteroperability with Java programs.” Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1206 n.11.
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The Court’s ruling on this point enables software developers in the
future to proceed somewhat more confidently, knowing that they can copy
aspects of code that are necessary for interoperability, particularly the
declaring code. Moreover, Google copied the SSO for the 37 API packages
in their entirety, which was barely mentioned in the Court opinion.
Google v. Oracle also has implications for functional material
generally, whether software or other types of subject matter. As Professor
Dennis Crouch observed (prior to the Court’s ruling), ““[a]lthough the API
was found not to violate the limitations of 102(b), I would suggest that this
close-call should have a relevant impact on the scope of fair use.”145
Put another way, copyright protection for the declaring code and SSO
of the 37 API packages should be “thin” because their design and creation
include significant functional considerations. It does appear that copyright
protection for works that have a functional element will be narrower and
more readily constrained under the fair use analysis. Reimplementation of
code from one platform to another, for example from a desktop to a mobile
device, is very likely to be considered a transformative use of that code and,
therefore a fair use.
C. The Role of the Derivative Market and of the Public Interest in the
Market Effect Factor
One of the most important implications of the ruling in Google v.
Oracle is its analysis of market effect, and in particular its novel emphasis
on the role of the public interest. The statute provides for consideration of
the effect of the taking on the “market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”146 Justice Breyer observed that, “at least where computer programs
are at issue, [this factor] can prove more complex than at first it may seem.”147
Justice Breyer explained that not only the amount of the potential loss, but
also its source must be considered: “As we pointed out in Campbell, a ‘lethal
parody, like a scathing theatre review,’ may ‘kil[l] demand for the original.’
Yet this kind of harm, even if directly translated into foregone dollars, is not
‘cognizable under the Copyright Act.’”148
The Court then added this seemingly new consideration: “we must take
into account the public benefits the copying will likely produce. Are those
benefits, for example, related to copyright’s concern for the creative
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Dennis Crouch, Google v. Oracle: Fair Use of a Copyrighted API, PATENTLYO (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/google-oracle-copyrighted.html [https://perma.cc/K82L-NYQD].
146
17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4).
147
Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1206.
148
Id. (citations omitted).
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production of new expression? Are they comparatively important, or
unimportant, when compared with dollar amounts likely lost . . . ?”149
Applying the “harm to the public” factor, Justice Breyer found that
enforcing Oracle’s copyright would interfere with “creative improvements,
new applications,and new uses developed by users who have learned to work
with that interface.”150 Justice Thomas, in his dissent, addressed the
majority’s focus on harm to the public, observing that only 7.7% of current
Android devices run the versions at issue in this case. Justice Thomas also
noted that Apple and Microsoft created their own device operating systems
independently, that Java was always freely available to coders, and that any
lower court remedy would likely involve damages, not an injunction against
the use of Android.151 Indeed, it is in the equitable decision whether to issue
an injunction that the public interest factor weighs heavily, as the Court
observed in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.152
In Justice Thomas’ view, “Google decimated Oracle’s market and
created a mobile operating system now in over 2.5 billion actively used
devices, earning tens of billions of dollars every year. If these effects on
Oracle’s potential market favor Google, something is very wrong with our
fair-use analysis.”153
The Court in Campbell has previously stated that “market harm is a
matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not only with
the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the
other factors.”154 Despite the powerful evidence of market harm—actual and
potential—inflicted by Google, the clear implication of the majority’s ruling
is that it can be outweighed by other considerations.
The evidence of harm, which as noted above, is quite arguably in the
billions, and estimates suggest Oracle’s damages claim would amount to $9
billion. This figure presents an interesting contrast with the $12,500 loss in
Harper & Row, which was given significant weight in the majority’s
rejection of the fair use defense. The Harper & Row Court found that
“Time’s cancellation of its projected serialization and its refusal to pay the
$12,500 were the direct effect of the infringement . . . Rarely will a case of
copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of actual damage.”155

149
150
151
152
153
154
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Id. at 1214–1217 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
eBay, 547 U.S. at 388.
Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1215 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The evidence of actual market harm included (1) the fact that Java SE
was used inmobile devices (Blackberry, SavaJe, Danger, and Nokia) and in
tablets (the Amazon Kindle), making the parties direct competitors; and (2)
when Android entered the market, Amazon selected it over Java SE, and later
was able to get a large discount to use Java SE in a newer Kindle device. The
impact on the market for potential derivative uses, including potential
licensing agreements, should be considered, as was noted in Campbell,156
Google’s copying could have an impact on Oracle’s potential markets, as
highlighted by the fact that Oracle and Google engaged in (unsuccessful)
licensing negotiations to license its work for smartphones. As the Federal
Circuit noted: “Smartphones were, therefore, a traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed market.” Thus, even though Oracle never built a
smartphone, potential markets include licensing others to develop derivative
works.157 And a potential market can be found even if the copyright owner
“has no immediate plans to enter it or is unsuccessful in doing so.”158
It does seem that the majority’s approach on the market effect factor, if
applied inother contexts, would undermine the ability of copyright owners
to claim harm to various derivative markets that might reasonably be
expected to secure. It is a striking contrast to the Court’s suggestion, for
example, in Campbell, that there might be a derivative market for a rap
version of the song, Pretty Woman. Presumably, if the copyright owner had
been able to establish the existence of such as a market, this would have tilted
the balancing against fair use.159
Going forward, it will be worthwhile to see how lower courts will apply
the Google v. Oracle approach when ascertaining market harm, particularly
as to derivative or potential markets and as to situations in which there might
a public interest argument for allowing use of creative expression. To the
extent that derivative and potential markets might not give sufficient weight,
this result would run counter to the express language of the fair use statute
itself. It could also have a disproportionate impact on individual authors and
small businesses that might not be in a position to exploit every potential
derivative market that might be pursued.
To the extent the public interest is given weight in the fair use
balancing, it seems to add a consideration not found in the statute and one
that is usually best taken into account in decided whether injunctive relief is
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
Id.
158
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1210.
159
Id. So too the Court suggested there was a fact issue as to whether 2 Live Crew took too much
when it repeated the distinctive bass riff in the song. See id.
157
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appropriate.160 It may well be that the Court, by avoiding a determination of
the scope of what is copyrightable in the specific setting of computer
software, might inadvertently undermine copyright protection in other
contexts by revising the market harm analysis from its textual moorings and
from its congressional purpose.
D. The Role of Good Faith in Fair Use
One of the more dramatic statements or potential shifts in Justice
Breyer’s majority opinion is its treatment of role of good or bad faith in the
fair use analysis. He questioned the role of bad faith in the determination of
fair use: “As for bad faith, our decision in Campbell expressed some
skepticism about whether bad faith has any role in a fair use analysis. We
find this skepticism justifiable, as“‘[c]opyright is not a privilege reserved for
the well-behaved.’”161
This language is striking and is worth comparing to the treatment of fair
use in the Court’s other modern fair use cases. Justice Breyer cites footnote
18 from Campbell, which states as follows: “regardless of the weight one
might place on the alleged infringer’s state of mind, we reject Acuff–Rose’s
argument that 2 Live Crew’s request for permission to use the original should
be weighed against a finding of fair use.”162 The Campbell court cited three
authorities for this proposition. The first is the Court’s clear statement in
Harper & Row: “In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The
Nation’s stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hardcover and Time
abstracts. The Nation’s use had not merely the incidental effect but the
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder’s commercially
valuable right of first publication.”163
The Harper & Row Court further stated: “[a]lso relevant to the
‘character’ of the use is ‘the propriety of the defendant’s conduct.’ ‘Fair use
presupposes good faith and fair dealing.’ The trial court found that The
Nation knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript.”164 Clearly, the Harper
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See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18 (quoting Leval, supra note 63, at 1126).
162
Id. (citations omitted).
163
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
164
Id. at 562–63 (quoting Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A], at 13–72; and Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotations and other citations omitted). The
Court expanded on this point as to the facts of the instant case: “Unlike the typical claim of fair use, The
Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from ‘A Time to Heal.’ Fair use ‘distinguishes between a
true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit.’” Id. at 563 (quoting Wainwright
Sec. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations and other
citations omitted).
161
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& Row Court expressly relied upon the defendant Nation’s lack of good faith
as one of its central bases for its rejection of the fair use defense. That
conclusion suggests that the Court held that good faith considerations are
indeed relevant considerations in the fair use analysis.
Returning to footnote 18 in Campbell, the Court cited only two other
authorities. This first is Folsom v. Marsh,165 which ironically finds that good
faith does not bar a finding of infringement. The last and only authority
directly supporting Justice Breyer’s dictum is a law review article.166
At the end of its treatment of good faith, the Court found no lack of
good faith on the facts in Campbell: “Even if good faith were central to fair
use, 2 Live Crew’s actions do not necessarily suggest that they believed their
version was not fair use; the offer may simply have been made in a goodfaith effort to avoid this litigation. If the use is otherwise fair, then no
permission need be sought or granted. Thus, being denied permission to use
a work does not weigh against a finding of fair use.”167
Overall, the Google v. Oracle Court had “no occasion here to say
whether good faith is as a general matter a helpful inquiry. We simply note
that given the strength of the other factors pointing toward fair use and the
jury finding in Google’s favor on hotly contested evidence, that fact bound
consideration is not determinative in this context.”168
Thus, there is no holding on the good faith issue in this case, but Justice
Breyer’s language suggests that at least some justices seem open to
reconsidering its role in the fair use analysis. The good faith or bad faith
factor is directly embedded in the language of section 107 — the “purpose
and character of the use.” The factor was heavily relied upon in the Court’s
prior ruling in Harper & Row and has a long history in the case law on fair
use as an equitable rule of reason. To change or eliminate consideration that
statutory factor contradicts the language, history, and purpose of the fair use
statute.
E. Transformative Use
One long-awaited aspect of the Court’s ruling is its treatment of
transformative use. The Court’s analysis suggests a broad interpretation of
this fair use consideration. This issue is whether the use creatively
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Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
Leval, supra note 63, at 1126–27 (good faith irrelevant to fair use analysis).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 596 n.18 (1994) (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1204.
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contributed a “new expression, meaning or message.”169 Justice Breyer noted
that “Google copied portions of the Sun Java API . . . to enable programmers
to call up implementing programs that would accomplish particular tasks.
But since virtually any unauthorized use of a copyrighted computer program
(say, for teaching or research) would do the same, to stop here would
severely limit the scope of fair use in the context of computer programs.”170
Google’s use of the code was “highly creative and innovative” and
consistent with the innovative goals of copyright law.171 To Justice Breyer,
Google’s use was a “reimplementation” that took “only insofar as needed to
include tasks that would be useful in smartphone programs” so that
programmers could call upon those tasks in a familiar programming
language.172 Technically, only 170 of the 11,500 lines of code were actually
needed to run Java on the Android platform.
Because “shared interfaces are necessary for different programs to
speak to each other” and for programmers to “use their acquired skills,” the
use was transformative.173 Thus, even Google’s use was commercial and for
profit, these considerations are “not dispositive of the first factor, particularly
in light of the inherently transformative role that the reimplementation
played in the new Android system.”174
Justice Breyer’s view of transformative use contrasts dramatically with
the view of the Federal Circuit below and with Justice Thomas’ dissent. To
the Federal Circuit,“merely copying the material and moving it from one
platform to another without alteration is not transformative.”175 To be
transformative, the use should be for a different purpose or alter the
“expression, meaning, or message” of the original work.
Similarly, Justice Thomas viewed Google’s adaptation of Java code for
use in mobile devices as merely avoiding “the drudgery in working up
something fresh,” thereby fulfilling no favored copyright purpose, but rather
using Oracle’s expression “for the same exact purpose Oracle did.”176 Justice
169
Id. at 1202–03 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–81) (“[A]s we held in Campbell, a parody can
be transformative because it comments on the original or criticizes it, for ‘[p]arody needs to mimic an
original to make its point.’”).
170
Id. at 1203. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act states: “In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”
17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b).
171
Google, 141 S. Ct at 1203.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1203–04 (citation omitted).
174
Id. at 1204.
175
Oracle, 866 F.3d at 1201.
176
Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1219 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
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Thomas viewed the majority’s broad definition of transformative as one that
“eviscerates copyright. A movie studio that converts a book into a film
without permission not only creates anew product (the film) but enables
others to ‘create products’—film reviews, merchandise, YouTube highlight
reels, late night television interviews, and the like.”177 Thus, Justice Thomas
viewed Justice Breyer’s interpretation as “wrongly conflat[ing]
transformative use with derivative use. To be transformative, a work must do
something fundamentally different from the original. A work that simply
serves the same purpose in a new context—which the majority concedes is
true here—is derivative, not transformative.”178 In short, Justice Thomas
viewed Google’s actions as transforming (adapting), but not transformative.
Going forward, the broader interpretation of transformative use will
likely mean more successful fair use defenses in situations in which some
substantial creative expression was taken.179 With the Court’s rulings in
Campbell and Google v. Oracle, it is likely that many uses of copyrighted
material will be deemed transformative, particularly in the context of parody,
and in cases involving factualor functional subject matter.
F. The Standard of Review
The Court clearly settled the issue of how findings of fair use should be
reviewed on appeal. All justices agreed that these lower court or jury findings
should be reviewed as a mixed question of law and fact. This was not a
surprising result, as it was largely presaged by Harper & Row. Fair use,
Justice Breyer held, is a mixed question of law and fact. Justice Thomas
agreed. Therefore, the ultimate determination of fair use is deemed to be legal
work, subject to de novo review: “‘Fair use’ was originally a concept
fashioned by judges. Our cases still provide legal interpretations of the fair
use provision. And those interpretations provide general guidance for future
cases. This type of work is legal work.”180
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Id. at 1219.
Id.
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See generally Fox News Network, LLC v. Tveyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2018)
(rejecting fair use defense in case involving news aggregator “unlawfully profiting off the work of others
by commercially re- distributing all of that work that a viewer wishes to use, without payment or
license.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 595 (2018); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), holding
modified by Andy Warhol Found. For the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2021), and
holding modified by Andy Warhol Found. For Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021)
(25 of the artist’s 30 works incorporating a third-party’s photographs deemed tobe fair use but remanding
the consideration of the other five works); TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168,177 (2d
Cir. 2016) (defendant used a comedy routine in a scene in a Broadway play, the court reversed the lower
court finding of “highly transformative” use and held that this was not fair as a matter of law.).
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Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1200.
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On the other hand, underlying factual determinations are assessed under
the deferential standard of review. Examples of factual issues include harm
to actual or potential markets for the copyrighted work and the amount of the
copyrighted work was taken. Thus, the parties can develop a factual record
on the various specific fair use factors and considerations.
The Supreme Court did not really break new ground when it resolved
the fair use question by applying de novo review to the ultimate question of
fair use. Once the factual underpinnings have been determined, the fair use
question boils down to the inferences to be drawn from those facts and the
overall balancing of the factors, which will continue to be a determination of
law made by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s long-awaited pronouncement on fair use in
Oracle v. Google offers the first exposition and application of the test in more
than 25 years, since the 1994 ruling in Campbell. Because it avoided the
threshold copyright question of the extent to which software code is
protected subject matter, the Court addressed the fair use factors in a manner
that further muddies the waters and creates even greater uncertainty about
the scope of fair use than was prevalent before.
The first problem with the majority’s approach is its discussion of the
bad faith factor, which is directly embedded in the language of section 107—
the “purpose and character of the use.” The factor was heavily relied upon
in the Court’s prior ruling in Harper & Row and has a long history in the
case law on fair use as an equitable rule of reason. Yet Justice Breyer stated
that some language in “Campbell expressed some skepticism about whether
bad faith has any role in a fair use analysis. We find this skepticism
justifiable, as ‘[c]opyright is not a privilege reserved for the wellbehaved.’”181 Although the Court had “no occasion here to say whether good
faith is as a general matter a helpful inquiry,” its statement now raises the
question of whether good fair or bad faith should be taken into account in the
fair use balancing, and if so, what its role should be.
The second concern raised by Justice’s opinion is its narrow
interpretation of the important fourth fair use factor, “the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.”182 Despite Oracle’s modest success in
licensing Java for mobile devices, and the evidence that it did have a
potential market for licensing Java for such purposes, the Court essentially
negates that possible effect and thus essentially ignores the $42 billion boon
181
182
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that Google captured in that potential market. The Court suggested that this
harm was somehow not “cognizable,” referring to inapposite language from
Campbell.183
A lethal parody can indeed inflict incognizable harm on a copyrighted
work, but an adaptation of software from one platform to another seems
arguably much more like the type of derivative work right that Congress
sought to provide in section 106 of the Copyright Act. The Court hinged its
rejection of this type of harm on Oracle’s lack of major success in the mobile
market, something that might challenge future copyright owners that might
not be able to enter derivative markets quickly and directly. This is likely to
have a particularly damaging effect on individual authors and on small
businesses.
Third, the Court then added a seemingly new consideration in its fair
use analysis: “we must take into account the public benefits the copying will
likely produce. Are those benefits, for example, related to copyright’s
concern for the creative production of new expression? Are they
comparatively important, or unimportant, when compared with dollar
amounts likely lost . . . ?”184 Enforcing Oracle’s copyright, he continued,
would interfere with “creative improvements, new applications, and new
uses developed by users who have learned to work with that interface.”185
Justice Breyer’s addition of “harm to the public” as a consideration in
the market effect factor is not supported by the language or purpose of the
provision. Furthermore, it conflates an important consideration in the
assessment of remedies—whether an injunction would further or harm the
public interest186—into the determination of fair use in the lability stage of a
copyright case. Finally, the public interest factor should already be weighed
in assessing the purpose of the use and the nature of the copyrighted work.
Placing it on the scales again as part of themarket effect factor gives it too
much weight in the fair use determination, potentially allowing harmful
exploitation of the copyrighted work to pass muster as fair use.
Fourth, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of what constitutes a
transformative use, which helps address an issue that lower courts struggled
with since Campbell. On this front, the Court’s approach seems to be a
reasonable one, allowing for building upon prior materials, particularly in
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the context of works that serve functional purposes. Reimplementation will
be a favored use.
In short, although the Google v. Oracle decision provides reassurance
for software designers and arguably reached the right result, it does harm to
the already muddled fair use jurisprudence. How the lower courts will handle
these new complications is difficult to predict, but it seems likely that the
Supreme Court willeventually need to clarify the role of good faith, the scope
of potential markets thatmay be affected by a use, and the role (if any) of the
public interest in the market effect factor.

190

